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THE SELECTION, TENURE, AND 
EXTRAJUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE AND OTHER JUSTICES 
ALTERNATIVE CAREER RESOLUTION II:   
CHANGING THE TENURE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
STEPHEN B. BURBANK†
INTRODUCTION 
A great deal has been written about proposals to change the tenure of Su-
preme Court Justices.  Those proposals differ in numerous respects.  Some 
would establish fixed terms, renewable or nonrenewable; others would man-
date retirement at a certain age.  Some proposed terms are long, others short.  
Some of the proposals would meld service on the Court with service on the 
lower federal courts, whether as an attempt to avoid the need for a constitu-
tional amendment or a means to correct flaws the proponent perceives in the 
system of life tenure crafted by those who wrote the Constitution. 
The proposals that have received the most serious attention from  
lawmakers over time have involved constitutional amendments  
implementing mandatory retirement.1  In contrast, the proposals that are  
currently receiving the most serious attention from the academic  
 © Stephen B. Burbank 2006.  
 † David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsyl-
vania. 
 Morris Arnold, Lawrence Baum, Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman, Charles Geyh, Mark 
Graber, Andrew Kaufman, Herbert Kritzer, Ted Ruger, Kim Scheppele, David Shapiro, 
and Stephen Wasby provided helpful comments on a draft.  Gregory Cooper, Penn 
Law Class of 2007, provided excellent research assistance.  For the earlier article re-
ferred to in the title, see Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution:  An Essay on 
the Removal of Federal Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643 (1988).  A shorter version of this article ap-
pears as Stephen B. Burbank, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Tenure of Supreme Court 
Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT 317 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 
2006). 
 ¹ See ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE:  THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 136, 158-60 (2003) (discussing proposed consti-
tutional amendments in 1937 and 1946-1955); David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the 
U.S. Supreme Court:  The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 996, 
1023-26, 1028-43 (2000) (same). 
  
1512 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1511 
 
 
community involve a nonrenewable eighteen-year term, at the conclu-
sion of which a Justice would have the option to remain an Article III 
judge, empowered to participate in the work of the lower federal 
courts and, according to at least one proposal, to continue to partici-
pate in some of the Supreme Court’s judicial and nonjudicial work in 
certain circumstances.2  Proponents of nonrenewable eighteen-year 
terms differ on the question whether the change could be imple-
mented by statute. 
Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren have made by far the most 
elaborate case for moving from life tenure to nonrenewable eighteen-
year terms.  They present a variety of data showing that in the period 
since 1970:  (1) Justices have served far longer than the mean in the 
period prior to 1970 (26.1 years versus 14.9 years); (2) Justices have 
served to a much older mean age (79.5 versus 68.3); and (3) we have 
experienced both an increase in the mean interval between appoint-
ments (3 versus 1.91 years) and a disproportionate share of the long-
est intervals between appointments.3  As a result, the authors argue, 
the Court, for which the appointment process is (in their view) the 
only plausibly effective check ensuring democratic accountability, 
does not receive regular refreshment drawing it closer to popular un-
derstandings of the Constitution; the incentive of Presidents to ap-
point younger people to the bench is enhanced (depriving the nation 
of older, perhaps smarter and wiser people); the appointment process 
has become contentious and politicized to the detriment of the insti-
tution; and the problem of Justices overstaying their time has in-
creased in frequency, as has strategic partisan behavior of Justices in 
timing their  retirements.4
Because the field of proposals is crowded, I will concentrate on 
the case that these and other authors have made to replace life tenure 
for Supreme Court Justices with nonrenewable eighteen-year terms.  I 
do not intend to discuss the question whether, if our lawmakers 
deemed such a change desirable, they could implement it by statute as 
opposed to constitutional amendment.  That question is neither unin-
2 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:  
Life Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT 15 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. 
Carrington eds., 2006) (proposing a constitutional amendment prescribing nonrenew-
able eighteen-year terms); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court 
Renewal Act:  A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra, at 467 (argu-
ing that eighteen-year terms could be prescribed by statute and proposing such a stat-
ute). 
3 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 23-28. 
4 See id. at 30-44, 62. 
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teresting nor without difficulty.  In the absence of unambiguous text 
or precedent in the form of court decisions, and given that “constitu-
tional law” is not confined to court decisions, the answer to the consti-
tutional question would turn on an (explicit or implicit) assessment of 
the policy implications of changing the status quo. This, in turn, 
would (or should) depend on a comparative assessment of the bene-
fits and costs of the proposed alternative in light of the roles that the 
Supreme Court plays in our society. 
It is easy to see how, so framed, and whether or not couched in 
the language of constitutional law, a scholarly debate about judicial 
tenure could be dominated by the kind of “epistemic shallowness”5 for 
which law professors are infamous.  Indeed, the work of many en-
gaged in the debate is quite relentlessly normative and replete with 
unsupported causal assertions.6  For that reason I thought it useful to 
explore the question whether proponents’ assertions and predictions 
about political phenomena are supported by the theories or empirical 
evidence produced by those whose business it is to study political phe-
nomena.  More broadly, my goal in this Article is to begin to fill what I 
perceive to be both theoretical and evidentiary gaps.  I seek under-
standing in the literatures of other disciplines, particularly political 
science, of whether there are serious problems warranting attention 
and whether nonrenewable eighteen-year terms would solve those 
problems (without creating other problems). 
Approaching the subject from that perspective, I find that there is 
little evidence that life tenure on the Supreme Court, as it operates 
today, is responsible for some of the costs attributed to it or that the 
costs themselves are serious enough to warrant changing a basic struc-
tural arrangement at this time.  These include those costs proponents 
of change associate with presidential incentives in making nomina-
tions, the behavior of the Justices in connection with retirement, and 
the contentiousness of the appointment process.  The evidence also 
suggests to me that, in historical perspective, the problem of Justices 
remaining beyond the time they are up to the job is less serious than it 
5 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 88 (1995). 
6 Ward Farnsworth’s defense of life tenure is a prominent exception among the 
articles I have read.  See Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme 
Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407 [hereinafter Farnsworth, Regulation of Turnover].  A 
shorter version of this article appears as Ward Farnsworth, The Case for Life Tenure, in 
REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 2, at 251. 
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was in prior periods, before Congress enacted adequate provisions for 
retirement.7
I then turn to arguments that the current system of life tenure for 
Supreme Court Justices renders them insufficiently accountable to the 
public, threatening democratic legitimacy by distancing the Justices 
from popular understandings of constitutional meaning.  I argue that 
the accountability critique is impoverished because it focuses exclu-
sively on the appointment process and treats judicial independence 
and judicial accountability as both dichotomous and monolithic.  Ex-
clusive attention to the appointment process obscures other executive 
and legislative powers that can render the Court accountable, together 
with the norms, customs, and dialogic processes that have developed 
in their shadow, as it obscures normative and empirical scholarship 
suggesting that the Court in fact never strays very far or for very long 
from majority preferences.  The isolation of judicial independence 
from judicial accountability enables proponents to invoke comparative 
data that tell us very little, and it may also cause them to treat less seri-
ously than they should the potential costs that frequent and predict-
able appointments under their system might entail.8
In examining proponents’ claims concerning democratic legiti-
macy, I review the political science literature about the public’s 
knowledge of the Court and its decisions and how that knowledge 
translates into support (or lack of it).  I find little basis to believe that 
the public at large has understandings of constitutional meaning, as 
opposed to results in cases that are controversial or highly salient for 
some reason, let alone understandings of competing interpretive ap-
proaches.  I also find no credible evidence that the Court today lacks 
public support to an extent that should concern us; indeed, it enjoys 
greater support than Congress.9
Finally, I seek in the interest group literature clues to the sort of 
environment in which frequent and predictable appointments would 
likely play out.  The evidence suggests that, far from reducing the con-
tentiousness of the process, a system of frequent and predictable ap-
pointments might reinforce the worst tendencies of modern politics, 
causing a crisis in democratic legitimacy by shining more light more 
frequently on the Court, and by draping the Court’s work in the garb 
of the ordinary politics of which it would be seen to be a part.  The re-
7 See infra Part I and text accompanying notes 96-101. 
8 See infra Part II.A. 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
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sult, in other words, might be a quantum and quality of democratic 
accountability, shaped by the incentives and tactics of interest groups 
aligned with political parties, that could swamp the putative inde-
pendence augured by nonrenewable eighteen-year terms viewed in 
isolation.10
I.  THE PUTATIVE COSTS OF LIFE TENURE:  PRESIDENTIAL INCENTIVES, 
MENTAL DECREPITUDE, AND STRATEGIC PARTISAN RETIREMENT 
Calabresi and Lindgren are to be applauded for gathering and 
manipulating empirical data in order to quantify the perceived prob-
lems to which they respond.  Like many other proponents of change, 
however, they seem fixated on the current institution—at the end of 
its existence as a “natural court”11—and on incentives that may seem 
irresistible given the current political climate.  Lacking historical and 
institutional perspective, the enterprise has the air of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
What, for instance, should we make of Calabresi and Lindgren’s 
claim that their proposal “will eliminate the incentive Presidents cur-
rently have to find candidates who are even younger”12 or of others’ 
claim that the “problem with the current nomination system is that 
youth has been elevated from one factor among many to one of the 
most important considerations.”13  The average age at appointment 
has remained remarkably uniform over time (at around fifty-three).14  
The basic incentive to appoint younger people is life tenure.  As Ward 
Farnsworth suggests, logically, one would expect greater attention to 
age at appointment when life expectancies are short;15 empirical data 
support that logical supposition.16  Given numerous long tenures prior 
10 See infra Part III and Conclusion. 
11 “The period during which a court’s membership remains unchanged is known 
to political scientists as a natural court.”  Linda Greenhouse, Under the Microscope Longer 
Than Most, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, § 4, at 3. 
12 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 62. 
13 James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court:  A Pro-
posal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year 
Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1113 (2004); see also id. at 1110-16, 1122. 
14 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 30-31. 
15 See Farnsworth, Regulation of Turnover, supra note 6, at 428-29 (“[T]he incentive 
to make young appointments does not become greater as Justices live longer.”). 
16 “In the 18th and 19th centuries, the average age at appointment was 51.1 
years. . . . In the 20th century, the average age at appointment (for Justices who com-
pleted their service before 1997) has been 54.7 years.”  John Gruhl, The Impact of Term 
Limits for Supreme Court Justices, 81 JUDICATURE 66, 66 (1997). 
  
1516 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1511 
 
 
to 1970 and the ages of recent nominees, it seems implausible that the 
perceived lengthening tenure since then has had a significant impact 
on appointments, when compared, for instance, to a particular Presi-
dent’s agenda in making appointments.17  But we need not speculate; 
the question should be amenable to empirical investigation. 
Before doing such work, however, one should perhaps seek per-
spective on the phenomenon of “lengthening tenure.”  Working with 
medians rather than means,18 Kevin McGuire finds that “the tenure of 
the Justices has been quite stable over time,”19 that the median age of 
the current Justices (sixty-nine years) is not substantially higher than 
the historical median (sixty-three years, or sixty-four years from 
1900),20 and that, although the median service of the Justices today 
(eighteen years) is higher than the median service since the Civil War 
17 See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT:  THE POLITICS OF 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 65 (2005) (“Some commentators say the emphasis 
on youth reflects the president’s interest in creating a legacy.  That begs the question 
of what kind of legacy, however.  In many instances the answer is an ideological one.”); 
infra text accompanying notes 96-101.  David Yalof’s study of appointments from Tru-
man through Reagan does not support the claim that age has become a more impor-
tant criterion in recent years than it was in the (recent) past.  See DAVID ALISTAIR YA-
LOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES:  PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME 
COURT NOMINEES (1999).  In fact, the most rigid age criterion Yalof reports is the up-
per limit of sixty-two set by President Eisenhower.  Id. at 43; see also id. at 104 (recount-
ing that President Nixon “hoped to pair the sixty-one-year-old Burger with a younger 
nominee, hopefully ‘someone in their late forties and no older than sixty’”); id. at 127 
(explaining that Attorney General Edward Levi’s list of possible nominees for Presi-
dent Ford did not include anyone over sixty, “an indication that youth had also been a 
significant factor in Levi’s calculus”).  Perhaps most telling is Yalof ’ s evaluation of age 
as an appointment criterion in the Reagan administration.  “Age was a concern, but 
unlike with Eisenhower and Nixon, the administration did not impose on his subordi-
nates any fixed minimum or maximum at the outset that might preclude the consid-
eration of especially worthy candidates.”  Id. at 134; see id. (noting that “the most im-
portant criteria were ideological”).  Comparing the ages of some of the Justices 
nominated by Presidents Reagan and Bush (I) (including Scalia (fifty), Kennedy (fifty-
one), Souter (fifty-one), and Thomas (forty-three)), with those nominated by President 
Clinton (Ginsburg (sixty) and Breyer (fifty-five)), Gruhl concludes that it is “unclear 
whether extending control of the Supreme Court by appointing younger justices will 
be a goal of future Democratic or Republican administrations.”  Gruhl, supra note 16, 
at 68; see also David J. Garrow, Protecting and Enhancing the Supreme Court, in REFORMING 
THE COURT, supra note 2, at 271, 277-78. 
18 The use of means rather than medians for the relatively short period of 1971 to 
the present may distort comparison with means in the preceding period (1789-1970), 
particularly given the relatively small number of Justices and the long interval since the 
last departure in the former period.  Note also the potential effects of making the cut 
in 1970, since both Justices Black and Harlan retired in 1971. 
19 Kevin T. McGuire, An Assessment of Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 JUDICA-
TURE 8, 8 (2005). 
20 Id. at 10. 
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(which has rarely exceeded fifteen years) the retirement of Justice 
O’Connor combined with the retirement of one of the Court’s oldest 
members “would return the Court to its historical norm.”21
The treatment of “mental decrepitude”22 and strategic partisan re-
tirement by most proponents of change also strikes me as historically 
tone deaf.  Artemus Ward makes clear the importance of retirement 
arrangements in the historic progression from leaving the Court in a 
coffin to leaving when a Justice chooses.  Mental decrepitude is not a 
new problem; indeed, it is less of a problem today than it once was.  
Before adequate provisions for retirement became available, some Jus-
tices had no choice but to hang on, often for many years, until the bit-
ter end (unless Congress could be persuaded to enact a private bill).23  
Now that adequate retirement arrangements are in place, and given a 
discretionary docket and resources to hire (multiple) clerks, it is hard 
to explain mental decrepitude, to the extent that it has been a prob-
lem in recent decades, without considering ego and strategic partisan 
behavior. 
Those who rely on anecdotal evidence in contending that strategic 
partisan retirement has become not just more frequent, but also a 
21 Id. at 12.  Chief Justice Rehnquist died shortly after McGuire’s article was pub-
lished, fulfilling the second condition.  McGuire also has a different take on the ques-
tion whether the current situation poses a problem of “democratic accountability.”  He 
argues that, taking life expectancies into account, 
although the proportion of a justice’s lifetime spent on the Court has remained 
fairly stable for at least 150 years, the proportion of the average American’s life-
time that a justice spends on the Court has actually declined.  Critics may well 
be concerned about citizens having to live under a Court controlled by justices 
who long outlast those responsible for appointing and confirming them, but 
over time this problem has become better, not worse.  Seen in this way—that 
is, from the perspective of the average citizen—the justices have been spend-
ing less, not more time on the Court. 
Id. at 14. 
22 See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 1. 
23 Of the forty Justices who departed between 1801 and 1896, ten did so by resig-
nation or retirement, while thirty died in office.  See WARD, supra note 1, at 47, 70.  But 
see Sanford Levinson, Life Tenure and the Supreme Court:  What is to be Done?, in REFORM-
ING THE COURT, supra note 2, at 375, 381 (asserting that in the nineteenth century 
“most justices did not die in office because they had the good grace to retire”).  Be-
cause the 1869 legislation authorizing retirement (formally resignation on salary) ap-
plied only to those at least seventy years old and with ten years of service, special legis-
lation was required to permit Justice Hunt, who became disabled before reaching ten 
years of service, to retire.  See WARD, supra note 1, at 86-87.  Similar legislation also 
proved necessary to permit the retirement of Justice Moody in 1910 and of Justice Pit-
ney in 1922.  Id. at 106, 116. 
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problem worthy of attention in recent decades, confront a number of 
difficulties.24  Many of their examples involve Justices whose supposed 
preference to retire strategically yielded to declining health and/or 
other personal considerations; the evidence is lacking that partisan 
motivation strongly influenced, let alone dominated, the retirement 
decisions of many other Justices.25  The former instances in fact pro-
vide anecdotal support for studies showing that, over time, partisan 
considerations have paled in comparison with other factors, including 
personal considerations and the availability of pension benefits, in 
motivating retirement.26  The most recent of these studies found “no 
24 Robert Nagel correctly points out that “while somewhat unseemly from some 
perspectives, timed retirement decisions are not obviously different from any number 
of strategic decisions that justices routinely make in an effort to prolong and maximize 
their influence.”  Robert F. Nagel, Limiting the Court by Limiting Life Tenure, in REFORM-
ING THE COURT, supra note 2, at 127, 128.  He also observes that, “even on the assump-
tion that timed retirements are different from and more regrettable than other efforts 
at prolonged influence, it is not clear why they are suddenly such a serious problem as 
to warrant changing the long-standing practice of life tenure.”  Id. 
25 This leads some proponents of change to rather odd conclusions.  See, e.g., Di-
Tullio & Schochet, supra note 13, at 1109 (“Though both . . . [Warren and Douglas] 
were ultimately prevented from strategically retiring, the very fact that they attempted 
and thought they could succeed in strategically departing demonstrates the weaknesses 
of the current system of appointments to the Court.”). 
 Based on timing, their relative good health, or both, Justices Harlan, Stew-
art, Burger, White, and Blackmun can be classified as being motivated by par-
tisanship in their departure decisions.  While there is little direct evidence to 
substantiate such a conclusion for any of them, circumstances suggest as 
much.  There is, on the other hand, direct evidence that Earl Warren was 
clearly partisan in his departure attempt, and that William O. Douglas and 
Lewis Powell had at least some partisan concerns.  Though Justices Brennan 
and Marshall ultimately did not depart for partisan reasons, they were initially 
partisan in their departure considerations.  Overall, these cases suggest a new 
level of partisanship in the departure decision-making of the justices.  
WARD, supra note 1, at 209; see also EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 17, at 36-40 (finding 
retirements to be more often motivated by politics than by economics).  But see Garrow, 
supra note 17, at 277 (“Serious questions of interpretive accuracy mar th[e] contention 
that” strategic retirement is a pervasive and urgent problem.).  Note further that any 
partisanship attributed to Justice Blackmun’s and Chief Justice Warren’s retirement 
planning relies on the incumbency of presidents of the other party than that to which 
their appointing presidents belonged.  See infra note 143. 
26 See Peverill Squire, Politics and Personal Factors in Retirement from the United States 
Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 180 (1988) (finding that political considerations fail to 
account for voluntary departure but that physical infirmity and pension eligibility in-
fluence the probability of retirement); Christopher J.W. Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, 
A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145 
(2000) (finding little evidence of political factors influencing either retirement or 
death-related vacancies).  But cf. Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements:  A Political 
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consistent support for justices taking partisan factors into account, ei-
ther in their retirement decisions or in their decisions to remain on 
the bench.”27  As Albert Yoon explains in a forthcoming study of judi-
cial turnover on the federal courts as a whole: 
[W]hile judges may hold preferences regarding the political environ-
ment in which they vacate their seat, they do not appear to optimize 
solely over them.  Much of this can be explained [by] judges’ lack of 
control over the political environment.  Judges, while they may desire a 
favorable political environment to emerge, cannot compel it. . . . More-
over, even when the political climate is favorable, the judge, when con-
sidering other factors-–e.g., job satisfaction, institutional norms, a sense 
of civic duty-–may choose to remain on the bench.
28
  
There is, thus, reason to doubt whether some of the supposed 
costs of the current system constitute serious problems today, and it is 
clear that some of them are less serious than they once were.  If any 
cost properly attributable to the current system of life tenure is 
deemed serious enough to warrant a change, those responsible for 
our institutions should consider more finely tailored solutions.  In that 
regard, because he was preoccupied with strategic partisan retirement, 
Ward proposed changing the current statutory retirement scheme, 
pursuant to which a Justice can retire at or after age sixty-five upon 
achieving any combination of age and service totaling 80 (the so-
called flexible “Rule of 80”), to a flexible Rule of 100, 110, or 120.29  
Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25, 39-40 (1993) 
(finding an identifiable political element relating to the timing of retirements from the 
Court, but using mean age instead of infirmity or pension eligibility as variables).  
Calabresi and Lindgren, relying on Farnsworth, cite the Hagle study, but neither arti-
cle cites the more recent study by Zorn and Van Winkle (or the earlier study by 
Squire).  See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 33 n.57.  For other work disputing 
the importance of this phenomenon, see Saul Brenner, The Myth that Justices Strategically 
Retire, 36 SOC. SCI. J. 431, 438 (1999), which found that strategic behavior was uncom-
mon among post-1937 Justices “who retired at an ideologically favorable time as well as 
those who failed to do so.” 
27 Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 26, at 160. 
28 Albert Yoon, The End of the Rainbow:  Understanding Turnover Among Federal Judges, 
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2006) (manuscript at 18, on file with au-
thor).  Although Yoon concludes that district court and court of appeals judges “are 
increasingly synchronizing their tenure of active service with their pension qualifica-
tion [i.e., taking senior status as soon as eligible to do so],” he finds that phenomenon 
operating “essentially not at all among Supreme Court justices.”  Id., manuscript at 4.  
The point he makes in the passage quoted in the text is, however, equally applicable to 
the Justices. 
29 See WARD, supra note 1, at 233-37. 
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Yet, as he recognized, such changes to retirement rules for the pur-
pose of thwarting strategic partisan retirement might exacerbate the 
problem of mental decrepitude.30  McGuire has sketched how pension 
incentives could be structured to encourage retirement at a given age, 
thereby addressing both problems (to the extent they exist).31
II.  MORE PUTATIVE COSTS:  ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY 
Proponents of changing the tenure of Supreme Court Justices 
claim that life tenure today, by reason of longer life expectancies and 
whatever other phenomena contribute to supposedly “lengthening 
tenure,” results in the Court being too far removed from the will of 
the people, so that it is insufficiently “democratically accountable and 
legitimate.”32  An associated claim made in support of nonrenewable 
eighteen-year terms is that, as a result of frequent and predictable ap-
pointments, the Court will better reflect “popular understanding of 
the Constitution’s meaning.”33  Calabresi and Lindgren make an addi-
tional, analytically distinct claim that the people favor textualism or 
originalism and thus that their proposal will not only bring the Court’s 
decisions, but also its methods, into closer accord with majority pref-
erences.34  Finally, because proponents in general tend to regard the 
appointment process as the only means of ensuring the Court’s ac-
countability and legitimacy, they regard the current Court as exercis-
ing power that is not only “great” but “totally unchecked.”35  I take up 
these claims regarding accountability and legitimacy separately below. 
30 See id. at 236. 
31 See McGuire, supra note 19, at 15. 
32 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 58.  See Terri L. Peretti, Promoting Equity in 
the Distribution of Supreme Court Appointments, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 2, at 
435, 436-41 (discussing the appointment process “as a tool of democratic control”). 
33 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 48, 58. 
34 See id. at 48-49, 59, 76-77. 
35 Id. at 17;  see id. at 37-39 (finding the appointment process to be “the only check 
that the other two branches have on the Supreme Court”); see also Carrington & Cram-
ton, supra note 2, at 468-69 (discussing traits associated with “unchecked power”).  
Compare Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 36 n.64 (acknowledging but disparaging 
the effectiveness of other “indirect means” of instilling “the public’s political values”), 
with id. at 72 (relying on existing “political checks” in answering the argument that 
term limits would unduly impinge upon judicial independence). 
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A.  Accountability 
Both the political science literature and interdisciplinary work on 
judicial independence and accountability suggest that, although the 
Supreme Court does exercise “great power,” it is not “totally un-
checked” in doing so.  That is not surprising when one considers that 
“the Constitution would provide very little protection against an ex-
ecutive and legislature intent on controlling the decisional independ-
ence of the federal courts.”36  Proponents of changing the tenure of 
Supreme Court Justices should thus treat more seriously (and consis-
tently) a variety of means, in addition to the appointment process and 
the impeachment process, by which Congress and the executive 
branch have in the past exercised influence, even in matters of consti-
tutional law, and may do so in the future.37
Numerous political scientists, from Robert Dahl, to Robert 
McCloskey, to Gerald Rosenberg, have disputed, and provided em-
pirical evidence controverting, the proposition that the Court is unac-
countable to the other institutions of government when deciding 
cases.38  Their work, together with more recent work by Lee Epstein, 
Jack Knight, and Andrew Martin, and others who share their strategic 
perspective,39 suggests that the Court does not often have the last word 
even on matters of constitutional interpretation, and that as a result it 
does not stray very far or for very long from what the majority wants.  
36 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independ-
ence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 9, 14 (Stephen B. Burbank & 
Barry Friedman eds., 2002). 
37 See Burbank & Friedman, supra note 36, at 12-14 (discussing court-stripping, ju-
risdictional regulation, court packing, budgetary control, and executive enforcement 
of judgments); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDE-
PENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 36, at 160, 166-84 (examining the emer-
gence and development of a norm against court packing); Barry Friedman & Anna L. 
Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 127 (2003) (“It is true that none of 
these ha[s] been utilized in many years, but the possibility is there, and members of 
Congress resort, on occasion, to threatening the Court with such actions.”). 
38 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1994); 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality 
of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369 (1992); see also Friedman & Harvey, supra note 37, at 
127. 
39 See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Constitutional Interpretation from a Strategic Perspective, in 
MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW 170 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004); Neal 
Devins, Is Judicial Policymaking Countermajoritarian?, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW, 
supra, at 189; Louis Fisher, Judicial Finality or an Ongoing Colloquy?, in MAKING POLICY, 
MAKING LAW, supra, at 153. 
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Moreover, as Barry Friedman has observed, “there is general agree-
ment among political scientists, and increasing recognition among le-
gal academics, that more often than not the outcomes of Supreme 
Court decisions are consistent with popular opinion.”40
An argument about accountability solely from the perspective of 
the appointment process is not necessarily inconsistent with Dahl, in-
sofar as the latter’s claim that the Court “is inevitably a part of the 
dominant national alliance”41 stressed the regularity of appointments 
and hence, in his view, a likely congruence of the policy preferences 
of a Court majority and the policy aims of the dominant political coali-
tion.42  Yet, again, the appointment process is not the only means of 
making the Court accountable, a historical fact of institutional life 
that, it seems to me, renders even more attractive the argument of Ep-
stein and her colleagues that the resolution of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty “rests not on a coincidence of preferences, as 
Dahl suggests, but on an important effect of the separation of powers 
40 Barry Friedman, History, Politics and Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 
99, 114 (András Sajó ed., 2004); see also Nagel, supra note 24, at 131 (“One major com-
ponent of an explanation for American tolerance for judicial power and autonomy is 
the well documented fact that the Justices’ decisions are seldom far out of line with the 
preferences of national majorities as measured by polls or by working majorities in 
Congress.”). 
Overall, the Rehnquist Court’s record of representing American public opin-
ion is strikingly similar to that of five earlier Courts since the mid-1930s.  Set-
ting aside the handful of closely-divided or inconsistent polls, some 63 percent 
of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions were consistent with poll majorities, and 
the remaining 37 percent were inconsistent with the polls.  That compares to 
nearly identical figures of 62 percent consistent and 38 percent inconsistent 
for the Hughes, Stone, Vinson, Warren and Burger Courts together.  
Thomas R. Marshall, American Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 
177, 177 (2005).  But see Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 48 (“[T] he post-1970 
Supreme Court is, if anything, too insulated from public opinion.”). 
 Barry Friedman and Anna Harvey’s study of Supreme Court decisions overruling 
congressional statutes demonstrates “that the Court is significantly more likely to over-
turn congressional statutes when it faces an ideologically congenial Congress.”  Fried-
man & Harvey, supra note 37, at 138 (citation omitted); see id. at 139 (“In other words, 
the Court does defer to Congress, we believe, but it is more probably the sitting Con-
gress rather than the enacting one.  The sitting Congress has ample tools to discipline 
the Court, should Congress truly believe this is necessary.” (citation omitted)). 
41 Dahl, supra note 38, at 293. 
42 See id. at 284-85.  The decrease in turnover in recent years “has important impli-
cations if Dahl’s . . . thesis is correct.  A Supreme Court with a stable membership may 
be less responsive to changes in the political environment.  This could result in a loss 
of public support over time, something that might endanger the Court’s ability to per-
form its constitutional function.”  Squire, supra note 26, at 187. 
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system:  a strategic incentive to anticipate and then react to the desires 
of elected officials.”43  Even if one does not accept this strategic ac-
count, it remains true, as Friedman has pointed out, that “the law itself 
provides a mechanism for achieving majoritarian results” through a 
built-in “set of standards deferential to government, if not public, 
will.”44
From the perspectives of both history and neo-institutionalism, 
then, a view of accountability that begins and ends with the appoint-
ment process is impoverished because it focuses on one formal means 
of exercising power, excluding from view other such means, together 
with norms, customs and dialogic processes that have developed in 
their shadow and that may constitute the most important vehicles of 
“accountability” in a complex system of separated but interdependent 
powers.45  Among the norms and customs so neglected are the many 
ways in which, over time, the Court has exercised self-restraint, which, 
John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer argue, are critical to its continuing 
ability to use independent judgment when such judgment is re-
quired.46
There is another and more basic problem with the view of ac-
countability animating many proposals for change, however.  The 
sponsors tend to treat judicial independence and judicial accountabil-
ity as both dichotomous and monolithic.  This problem might not have 
been avoided by reading the political science literature.47  But recent 
43 Epstein et al., supra note 39, at 186. 
44 Friedman, supra note 40, at 116. 
45 See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE:  THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006).  Elaborating the work 
presented in Geyh, supra note 37, this recently published book makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of the “dynamic equilibrium” between Congress 
and the federal judiciary, the influences that contributed to its development, and the 
forces that currently place it in peril.  Professor Geyh convincingly argues that custom-
ary norms—of both Congress and the federal judiciary—have proved more important 
than constitutional text to judicial independence, and that recent controversies con-
cerning judicial appointments are best understood as reflecting greater reliance on a 
process that has never been constrained by independence norms to right the balance 
by assuring a greater measure of judicial accountability. 
46 See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:  
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2002).  The fact that the Court 
has not always exercised such restraint, including in the recent past, should not lead us 
to lose perspective.  See infra text accompanying notes 145-47. 
47 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
315, 327 (1999) (arguing that the common political science definition of judicial inde-
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interdisciplinary scholarship has revealed that, to the contrary, inde-
pendence and accountability are different sides of the same coin.  It 
has also shown that there is no one ideal mix of independence and 
accountability. Rather, the appropriate mix for a given court system, 
and indeed for a given court, depends upon what a polity seeks from 
that system or court.48  We may agree that a nonrenewable eighteen-
year term (which is, after all, consistent with the historical mean and 
the current median) does not represent a plausible threat to judicial 
independence when viewed in isolation.  One cannot, however, de-
termine whether the quantum or quality of judicial independence that 
nonrenewable eighteen-year terms would afford the Supreme Court of 
the United States is sufficient without at the same time considering 
the quantum and quality of accountability that such a proposal—and 
in particular the frequent and predictable vacancies it would entail—
portends, given what we seek from the Court today. 
In this light, data about the terms of tenure of the judges on high 
or constitutional courts of other countries, or on the high courts of 
the states of the United States, although useful in stimulating thought 
about alternatives, are potentially misleading.49  Such data by them-
selves tell us very little about judicial independence and accountability 
in those polities,50 and, as Farnsworth points out, one may have a dif-
pendence, “requiring virtual immunity from the influence of the other branches, or at 
least only minimal influence,” is “theoretically and practically . . . too unforgiving”). 
48 See Burbank & Friedman, supra note 36, at 14-22. 
Recognition of the complementary relationship between judicial independ-
ence and judicial accountability is the reason why . . . whenever we discuss ju-
dicial independence, we endeavor to ensure that the measure of independ-
ence we champion is consistent with the degree of judicial accountability 
called for by the institutions, customs, and norms of the state or federal system 
in question.  The same careful attention is called for when the focus is on the 
other side of the coin. 
Editorial, Judicial Accountability, 89 JUDICATURE 4, 4 (2005). 
49 See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 44-48, 65 (adducing such data). 
50 But see id. at 47 (“The nearly unanimous consensus against life tenure for state 
judges, both on the highest courts and on intermediate appellate courts, is telling, and 
it provides further evidence of the undesirability of maintaining a system of lifetime 
tenure in the present day.”)  Shall we therefore elect the Justices?  In fact, that possibil-
ity has been advanced for consideration, albeit without careful attention to the implica-
tions of experience in the states (including the constitutional impediments to avoiding 
the excesses of electoral politics), in an otherwise valuable contribution to the litera-
ture.  See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE:  FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINA-
TION PROCESS 170-77 (2005). 
 In a comparative study of judicial selection, Lee Epstein and colleagues posit a uni-
form definition of judicial independence and assume that it is a desirable end (in all of 
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ferent attitude about judicial tenure when first establishing a court sys-
tem than one does about changing one part of an interdependent sys-
tem that has served a polity reasonably well for more than two hun-
dred years.51  In any event, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions 
about the suitability for transplant of the arrangements made in dif-
ferent political systems without understanding those systems and the 
roles that courts are expected to play in them.52
B.  Legitimacy 
Gerald Rosenberg has noted the tension between, on the one 
hand, Dahl’s claim that such power as the Court has derives from “the 
unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitu-
tion”53 and, on the other hand, his “primary claim that the Court is a 
political institution, part of the dominant political alliance.”54  
Rosenberg also argued that the evidence did not support Dahl’s ad-
mittedly speculative claims about legitimacy.55  I find no such tension 
in the work of proponents for change, and I believe that their notions 
about legitimacy are suspect. 
As previously discussed, the dominant vision of democratic ac-
countability among those advocating change apparently includes only 
the accountability that the appointment process provides, ignoring 
the countries from which their data are taken), before asking “[w]hat sorts of formal 
rules . . . societies invoke to attain it.”  Lee Epstein et al., Comparing Judicial Selection Sys-
tems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 30 (2001).  They also treat judicial independence 
and accountability as dichotomous, see id., while at the same time acknowledging that 
“no formal retention rule can guarantee judicial independence,” id. at 31.  In any 
event, since they do not in fact explore the nature of judicial independence and ac-
countability in other countries, it seems not unfair to regard their comparative data as 
merely “useful in stimulating thought about alternatives.”  Supra text accompanying 
note 49. 
51 “The question is not whether life tenure would make sense for another country 
writing a new constitution.  The question is whether it makes sense for this country to 
switch away from [life tenure].”  Farnsworth, Regulation of Turnover, supra note 6, at 
451. 
52 See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, American Courts and the Policy Dialogue:  The Role of Ad-
versarial Legalism, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW, supra note 39, at 13 (exploring and 
explaining the unique reliance on adversarial legalism in the United States). 
53 Dahl, supra note 38, at 293. 
54 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Road Taken:  Robert A. Dahl’s Decision-Making in a 
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other powers and processes—formal and informal—by which the 
Court, acting strategically, may be influenced.  This leads to the un-
tenable claim that the Court today exercises not only great power, but 
that it is “totally unchecked” in doing so.  It also helps to understand 
the assertions that, without more regular and frequent turnover, the 
Justices are not accountable to current “popular understandings of 
constitutional meaning”56 and that irregular and infrequent vacancies 
can “prevent the American people from being regularly able to check 
the Court when it has strayed from following text and original mean-
ing.”57
Calabresi and Lindgren assert that life tenure today fosters a gap 
between the Court’s jurisprudence and “popular understandings of 
constitutional meaning”58 that is itself normatively undesirable and 
that threatens the Court’s democratic legitimacy.  Other proponents 
assert that “there should be some relationship between the voters’ 
choice of a president and the relative influence that president has on 
the Court.”59  If the appointment process were the only check on the 
Court’s power, and if “popular understandings of constitutional mean-
ing” could faithfully be translated through that process, perhaps regu-
lar appointments would solve both alleged problems and an addi-
tional problem that proponents of change lay at the door of 
infrequent and irregular vacancies on the Court:  the increasing con-
tentiousness of the confirmation process, leading to the Court’s politi-
cization. 
56 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 60. 
57 Id. at 38. 
58 Id. at 60.  As to the normative claim about “popular understandings of constitu-
tional meaning,” I will not attempt to rehearse or elaborate Ward Farnsworth’s elegant 
defense of “slow law” as an important check on temporary majorities.  See Farnsworth, 
Regulation of Turnover, supra note 6, at 411-18.  I would only note, particularly for the 
benefit of originalists, the extent to which Farnsworth’s account resonates with the pic-
ture of James Madison’s concerns so vividly painted some years ago by Jack Rakove.  See 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 290 (1996) (discussing Madison’s discovery on the basis of experience 
under state constitutions that “the true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled 
from their rulers than to defend minorities and individuals against factious popular 
majorities acting through government”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 439 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (contending that elected judges would 
have “too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing 
would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws”). 
59 DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 13, at 1117; see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra 
note 2, at 35-39, 58-59; Peretti, supra note 32, at 436-41. 
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Even those attracted by the view that the Court’s jurisprudence 
should faithfully and currently reflect “popular understandings of 
constitutional meaning” or “the country’s political values” should be 
interested in what the nature of those understandings is, how they are 
formed, and how faithfully they are represented by elected officials.  
Moreover, to the extent proposals for a fundamental change in the 
Court rely on a threat to democratic legitimacy, it is presumably rele-
vant to ask how the public views that institution and, in particular, 
whether there is any evidence of such a threat today.  The political sci-
ence literature has much to offer on both sets of questions, as it does 
on the claim that regular appointments would solve the supposed 
problem of politicization of the Court that proponents of change at-
tribute to infrequent, irregular, high-stakes confirmation battles. 
There is an extensive literature on what the public knows about 
the Court, how it comes by that knowledge, and how the knowledge 
members of the public have about the Court and its decisions trans-
lates into support for the institution.  Not surprisingly, the controversy 
over the 2000 presidential election and the Court’s role in that elec-
tion through its decision in Bush v. Gore60 has stimulated a great deal 
of recent scholarly research on these subjects, refining theoretical 
questions and furnishing quite current data on public attitudes to-
wards the Court. 
Study after study has shown that the public knows very little about 
the Court or its decisions, but that levels of awareness differ as be-
tween the attentive public (who tend to be better educated and more 
interested in politics and public affairs) and the nonattentive public.61  
60 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
61 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN 
COURTS:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303, 303 ( John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 
1991) (arguing that the Court’s decisions “lack saliency in all but a few situations”); 
Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the 
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 366 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (“[Citi-
zens] are much more likely to become aware of controversial issues that produce sub-
stantial and continued media coverage, while remaining ignorant of most other deci-
sions.  Only those most consistently interested in politics and the Court are likely to 
know of the full range of its work and decisions.”); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanen-
haus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:  Mapping of Some Prerequisites for 
Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 357, 363 (1968) (“Even the 
kinds of Court decisions that are apt to become most widely known are not particularly 
visible to a majority of the community.”); id. at 364 (“People with knowledge about 
politics and public officials are those most likely to know about the decisions of the Su-
preme Court.”). 
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In addition, numerous studies demonstrate that most members of the 
public acquire the knowledge they have about the Court and its deci-
sions from the mass media.  Although this is not surprising, it may 
help to understand a frequent counsel of caution about invoking the 
public’s ignorance.  Research has found that the public’s knowledge 
of the Court’s decisions varies depending upon a number of factors, 
including the extent and duration of media coverage and the per-
ceived salience of the contested issue.  Salience can be defined either 
as the perceived relevance to a person’s personal circumstances (e.g., 
race, religion)62 or to her circumstances as a member of a geographic 
community.63
Gerald Rosenberg has noted that “[t]he positive relationship often 
asserted between Court decisions and legitimacy depends on a level of 
public knowledge about the Court that may be missing.”64  Although I 
believe his account of the relevant literature neglects an important 
distinction—that between specific and diffuse support—which I shall 
discuss, one who has read that literature has difficulty understanding 
appeals to “popular understandings of constitutional meaning.” In-
deed, three considerations—(1) the distinction emerging in the litera-
ture between the attentive and nonattentive public, (2) the evidence 
that only highly salient cases or issues are likely to prompt knowledge 
among the inattentive public, and (3) the fact that such knowledge re-
lates less to “constitutional meaning” than it does to results65—suggest 
that what we have here is an appeal to the understandings of the por-
tion of the public with which the person making the appeal identi-
fies.66  Certainly, the evidence offered for the proposition that the peo-
62 See Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 61, at 362 (explaining that the issues most 
apt to be salient “are clearly the ones that can be viewed in an intensely personal fash-
ion:  race, religion, and the security of life and property”). 
63 See Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 89, 97 (2000) (“Most people may not know about most, or even many, of the 
rulings, but they do hear about those that have some relevance to their community.”).  
Note also the possibility that “[a]n unusually controversial court decision [may be] 
able to cross the attention threshold of some of those for whom the judicial system is 
not a matter of everyday concern.”  Richard Lehne & John Reynolds, The Impact of Judi-
cial Activism on Public Opinion, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 896, 901 (1978). 
64 Rosenberg, supra note 54, at 628. 
65 “In fact, evidence suggests that Americans’ view of the Court is driven by their 
substantive agreement with its decisions.”  Id. 
66 Cf. Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425, 429 
(2005) (“Institutional legitimacy is predicated on desirable results, not on jurispruden-
tial methods mastered only by a few elite law professors.”); Nagel, supra note 24, at 130 
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ple prefer constitutional interpretation that focuses on “text and his-
tory”67 pales in comparison with direct evidence of profound general 
ignorance of the institution, its methods, and the great bulk of its 
work product among most members of the public. 
There is, in fact, some evidence that, when specifically offered 
choices, the public favors, in general, an approach to the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution that gives weight to “[t]he intentions of the 
people who wrote the Constitution” and to the “Court’s past decisions 
on similar matters,” far more than they do one that reflects “[w]hether 
the judges are liberals or conservatives.”68  In the same study, however, 
approximately two thirds of the respondents believed that “[w]hat the 
majority of the public favors” should have either some impact or a 
large impact on Supreme Court decisions, while close to three quar-
ters of them were of the same opinion as to “[t]he judges’ views of 
what is good for the public, even if it’s not addressed in the Constitu-
tion.”69  How does one fashion a coherent approach to interpretation 
from that, and how useful is it with respect to the great constitutional 
issues of the day?  Moreover, what interpretive significance would the 
average member of the public accord to the intentions of those who 
ratified the Constitution?  Would that person agree with James Madi-
son that original intentions must at some point yield to precedent and 
(“As to the empirical claim that the public would push for legalistic values, my own po-
sition is that the confirmation process has been dominated by doctrinal and jurispru-
dential considerations and that this emphasis is unfortunate precisely because it gives 
excessive influence to elites.”). 
67 Calabresi and Lindgren note: 
We think the public has consistently voted since 1968 for presidential candi-
dates who have promised to appoint Supreme Court justices who would inter-
pret the law rather than making it up.  Even the Democrats who have won 
since 1968, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, were from the moderate wings of 
the Democratic party, and the two Democrats appointed to the Court since 
1968 are well to the right of Earl Warren or William Brennan.  
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 76.  On the hazards of trying to derive public 
opinion about discrete issues from election returns, see, e.g., Barry Cushman, Mr. Doo-
ley and Mr. Gallup:  Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. 
REV. 7, 10-11, 76 (2002) (“We must first remember the American people the way they 
were, not as we might like to imagine them.”). 
68 John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion:  Popular 
Expectations Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 
181, 185 tbl.1 (2001). 
69 Id. 
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to the “constitutional law” of practice?70  Finally in this aspect, is 
originalism itself a “political value,” and is it in any event well calcu-
lated to yield results that accord with “the country’s political values”? 
In the same group of respondents favoring an interpretive ap-
proach that privileges original intent and precedent over ideology, 
more believed that, in actual practice, ideology has a large impact on 
Supreme Court decisions than either precedent or the intentions of 
the Framers.71  This might suggest that there should be evidence of a 
problem of democratic legitimacy.  For, as the authors of this study 
observe, “[i]f over time the public (and, especially, the political class) 
perceives the Court as ‘just another political institution,’ there may be 
grave consequences for the Court’s legitimacy.”72  The authors did 
find that the discrepancies between respondents’ normative prefer-
ences and their beliefs about the factors actually influencing the 
Court’s decisions “detract[ed] from the Court’s overall image.”73  But, 
while the strongest negative effect was associated with the intentions of 
the Framers, the weakest was associated with ideology, suggesting that 
“the public appears to have by and large resigned itself to this influ-
ence.”74  Moreover, the respondents rated “the performance” of the 
Court higher than they did that of either the “federal government in 
general” or the Congress,75 and both their evaluation of the federal 
government and of the Court’s performance in the criminal justice 
area were better predictors of their evaluation of the Court overall 
than was the “legal factor” (intent and precedent).76
Putting to the side questions about what kind of support a ques-
tion about the Court’s “performance” measures,77 these studies are 
70 See Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 267, 285 (1997) (explaining that Madison “knew that courts are not the only or-
gans of government that make constitutional law”). 
71 See Scheb & Lyons, supra note 68, at 185 tbl.1. 
72 Id. at 181-82. 
73 Id. at 187. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. at 190 app. 
76 See John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of 
the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 936 (2000). 
77 Scheb and Lyons sought “to avoid the thorny theoretical problem of whether 
support for the Court can and should be differentiated into ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ 
support” by “focusing on public evaluation of the Court in its most global sense.”  Id. at 
935 n.3.  I am inclined to believe that a question asking whether the Court’s “perform-
ance is generally poor, fair, good, or excellent,” Scheb & Lyons, supra note 68, at 190 
app., measures specific support.  See Benjamin I. Page, Comment, The Rejection of Bork 
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hardly evidence of a serious problem of legitimacy, and I am aware of 
no such evidence.  To be sure, “legitimacy” is a slippery term in the 
literature of constitutional law, so much so that Richard Fallon was re-
cently moved to write an article devoted to unpacking that concept.78  
It has the same elusive potential in political science, but far more 
work, theoretical and empirical, has been done that seeks to bring it 
to ground.  That work is more important to the current inquiry than 
are discussions of “legitimacy” in constitutional law if only because, in 
testing theory with evidence, it provides a basis for evaluating the 
claim that infrequent and irregular vacancies damage the Court’s de-
mocratic legitimacy. 
That which Fallon refers to as “sociological legitimacy”79 is akin to 
what political scientists call “diffuse support,” that is, support for the 
institution whether or not one agrees with particular products (deci-
sions).  Political scientists distinguish diffuse support from “specific 
support,” that is, support based on particular products (decisions).80  
It is diffuse support, I believe, to which the late Judge Richard Arnold 
was referring when he stressed, as he often did, the need for the fed-
eral courts to have the “continuing consent of the governed,”81 if they 
were to preserve the independence necessary for them to make un-
popular decisions required by law.  Some political scientists do not be-
lieve that it is possible to disaggregate specific and diffuse support.  
Most believe, however, that the distinction is theoretically valuable, 
Preserved the Court’s Limited Popular Constituencies, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1024, 1024 (1990) 
(remarking that “performance . . . really taps specific support”); infra text accompany-
ing note 84. 
78 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1789 
(2005). 
79 “When legitimacy is measured in sociological terms, a constitutional regime, 
governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense inso-
far as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of 
support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”  Id. at 
1795. 
80 See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965); Gregory 
A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992) (“In principle, diffuse support differs from specific support 
in its sources, greater durability, and more fundamental basis.”). 
81 E.g., Richard S. Arnold, Judges and the Public, LITIG., Summer 1983, at 5; see also 
Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present, and Future:  Precedent, Poli-
tics and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 42-43 (2005).   
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and there appears to have been progress in designing instruments that 
permit one to make the separation.82
Although the precise nature of the concern about democratic le-
gitimacy is not clear, and even if (pace Judge Arnold) diffuse support 
is not a good measure of accountability to the public, those scholars 
who have been most insistent on the distinction between diffuse and 
specific support acknowledge that there is a dynamic process at work, 
such that repeated decisions eroding specific support might adversely 
affect diffuse support.83  Moreover, polls regarding confidence in 
leadership seem to measure a combination of specific and diffuse sup-
port.84  Where, then, is the empirical evidence that the Court’s stand-
ing has suffered to an extent that should concern us because it is cur-
rently not accountable to the public or is so regarded by the public?  
Recent studies show that, to the contrary, the Court enjoys a deep res-
ervoir of goodwill (diffuse support), notwithstanding Bush v. Gore.85  
82 See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 80, at 637 n.1 (“We think it possible with care-
ful conceptualization and measurement to keep the two separate.”); James L. Gibson et 
al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 356 
(2003) (noting that most scholars “recognize a difference at least at the theoretical 
level”); Stephen P. Nicholson & Robert M. Howard, Framing Support for the Supreme 
Court in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore, 65 J. POL. 676, 678 (2003) (agreeing with Cal-
deira and Gibson “that such a distinction is theoretically and empirically feasible”). 
83 See Gibson et al., supra note 82, at 356 (“Over the long-term, the two types of 
support should be related (and may converge) . . . .”). 
84 See id. at 357 (suggesting that confidence may measure “something akin to 
‘presidential popularity,’ rather than enduring institutional loyalty”); James L. Gibson 
et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000:  Wounds, Self-Inflicted or 
Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 555 (2003) (“[C]onfidence is too much affected by 
short-term forces.”). 
85 See Gibson et al., supra note 82, at 359 (asserting that the Court “enjoys a rea-
sonably deep reservoir of good will, even after the tumultuous presidential election of 
2000”); see generally Herbert M. Kritzer, The American Public’s Assessment of the Rehnquist 
Court, 89 JUDICATURE 168 (2005).  Professor Kritzer treats as measures of diffuse sup-
port responses to questions that other scholars believe tap either specific support or 
some combination of diffuse and specific support.  See id. at 169; supra text accompany-
ing note 77; infra text accompanying note 93.  Kritzer’s analysis of five sets of time se-
ries data leads him to the following conclusion: 
What is perhaps most striking about the analysis presented above is that one is 
likely to draw different conclusions about trends in support for the Supreme 
Court depending upon which survey series one looks at.  It is not even clear 
that one can draw strong conclusions about whether one group of party iden-
tifiers is more supportive than others during a particular period of time.  For 
example, while both the Gallup and Pew series currently show Republicans as 
more supportive of the Court than are Democrats, there is little difference be-
tween Republicans and Democrats in the most recent [National Elections 
Studies] study.  Similarly, while both Gallup and Pew show declining support 
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Indeed, it enjoys greater diffuse support than Congress.86  Moreover, 
“[t]he American people . . . consistently have expressed greater confi-
dence in the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary than in Con-
gress.”87
It is possible, of course, to make an argument that Congress itself 
does not represent public values, because, as Jeb Barnes has pointed 
out, “(1) elections do not guarantee majoritarian lawmakers and (2) 
even if members of Congress are perfectly representative of their con-
stituents, taking votes among elected members of Congress does not 
guarantee majoritarian legislation.”88  Indeed, Jeffrey Rosen recently 
opined that the Court’s moderate majority better represents the views 
of average Americans than either the President or the (highly polar-
ized, bitterly partisan, entrenched by gerrymandering) Congress.89
Perhaps both the Court’s current power and its ability to draw on 
a deep reservoir of diffuse support reflect the instability of the domi-
nant coalition90 and the extent to which that coalition is out of touch 
with the “country’s political values.”  If so, however, that is hardly an 
advertisement for a proposed change in the Justices’ tenure, a central 
premise of which is the ability of the appointment process faithfully to 
since 2000, [the] NES [survey] continues to show a relatively steady level of 
support. 
Kritzer, supra, at 173-75. 
86 See James L. Gibson et al., Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose?  Testing 
Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 195 (2005)(“[B]ut 
the difference is not great.”). 
87 Editorial, Listening to Judge Lef kow, 88 JUDICATURE 240, 242 (2005). 
88 Jeb Barnes, Adversarial Legalism, the Rise of Judicial Policymaking, and the Separation-
of-Powers Doctrine, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW, supra note 39, at 35, 43.  Similarly, 
“the electoral process may not produce a president and Senate who truly represent the 
people’s views.”  Peretti, supra note 32, at 437.  It is also possible that the focus should 
not be on national majorities but rather on “the fact that the substantive outcomes im-
posed by the Court do frequently conflict with officially registered preferences of ma-
jorities within state and local governments.”  Nagel, supra note 24, at 131.  Having dis-
patched most of the concerns relied on by other proponents of fixed terms, Nagel sees 
“limiting life tenure [as] a slight and indirect solution to a truly massive problem.”  Id. 
at 136. 
89 See Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6, at 17; see also Gar-
row, supra note 17, at 271-72, 274 (noting “mainstream moderation” of the Rehnquist 
Court).  Rosen is developing this idea in a book.  See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DE-
MOCRATIC BRANCH:  HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (September 2005 draft) (on file 
with author). 
90 See Dahl, supra note 38, at 294 (explaining that when the dominant coalition is 
“unstable with respect to certain key policies . . . the Court can intervene . . . and may 
even succeed in establishing policy”). 
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translate such values to the Court.91  Moreover, it hardly seems a suffi-
cient foundation of demonstrated need for a constitutional amend-
ment.92  In that regard, and ironically, the political science literature 
on legitimacy suggests the great difficulty that proponents of this 
change might have in bringing it about.  For, whether in the form of a 
statute (if constitutional) or constitutional amendment, these propos-
als might be thought to involve a major change of the sort that re-
search indicates is broadly opposed by the American people, whatever 
their partisan or ideological affiliations.  It is questions about just such 
changes—as opposed to questions about confidence in the job the 
Court is doing, its performance, or confidence in its leaders—that 
those scholars who have written the most probing work on legitimacy 
deem best calculated to tease out differences between diffuse and spe-
cific support.93
The public might not, however, regard nonrenewable eighteen-
year terms as sufficiently fundamental to tap diffuse support, a possi-
bility suggested by research on opposition to FDR’s court-packing plan 
that reveals different views about court packing and mandatory re-
tirement.94  In all likelihood, it seems to me, that would depend upon 
how the proposal was framed, and in particular, on whether equal 
time was given to possible costs and benefits.  And it is the question of 
possible costs, as illuminated by the political science literature, that 
leads me to doubt the claim that the frequent and predictable ap-
pointments occurring under the proposed system of nonrenewable 
eighteen-year terms, once fully operational, would result in a less con-
91 The same is true of an alternative explanation advanced by Thomas Keck, as 
summarized by Mark Graber:  “Few precedential or political foundations presently ex-
ist for judicial restraint.  Contemporary law is activist and, as the failed Bork nomina-
tion demonstrates, the general public supports that activism.”  Graber, supra note 66, at 
441 (discussing THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY:  
THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004)). 
92 Noting the possibility that, “in times of severe political polarization, the Su-
preme Court has some tendency to be more centrist than Congress or the White 
House,” Mark Graber asks whether it would be “wise to tinker with the process for staff-
ing the [C]ourt before dealing with the forces underlying political polarization.”  Post-
ing of Mark Graber, mgraber@gvpt.umd.edu, to The Law And Courts,  
lawcourts-l@usc.edu (July 12, 2005, 10:26 EST) (on file with author). 
93 See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 80, at 636-41; id. at 639 (“[D]iffuse support is 
opposition to basic structural and functional change.”); supra note 77. 
94 See Cushman, supra note 67, at 71-73 (noting that fifty percent of respondents in 
a poll opposed court packing, while seventy percent supported mandatory retirement, 
most at age seventy). 
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tentious nomination/confirmation process and in less politicization of 
the Court.95
III.  POSSIBLE COSTS OF FREQUENT AND PREDICTABLE APPOINTMENTS 
At the outset, I question the premise that lengthening tenures 
have much to do with, let alone are a primary cause of, the increased 
politicization of the confirmation process;96 I also question the claim 
that Supreme Court confirmation controversies have infected the ap-
pointment process for the lower federal courts.97  Both the relatively 
noncontroversial confirmations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and a 
comparison of lower court nominations that generated controversy 
with those that did not suggest much more likely causal influences:  
95 This regularity in the Supreme Court nomination process should greatly 
reduce, if not prevent, the intense desire on the part of interest groups and 
partisans to use what are now infrequent and unpredictable Court vacancies as 
opportunities to flex their ideological muscles and create new controversies 
and grudges to feature in their fundraising appeals.  With regularity comes 
routine, and with routine comes less impassioned and more deliberative con-
sideration of nominees.  
DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 13, at 1141; see id. at 1143 (“Viewed objectively, there is 
little doubt that the uncertainty of expectations has clouded the current process and 
created a climate of fear and anxiety that has bred contempt and partisan sniping in 
the judicial confirmation process.”); see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 61 
(“By creating a predictable schedule of frequent appointments, our proposed amend-
ment should reduce the intensity of the politics associated with confirmations at the 
Supreme Court level, [as well as perhaps in the lower federal courts].”).  As the discus-
sion below demonstrates, these assertions manifest no knowledge of how interest 
groups actually behave.  Moreover, of course, federal court of appeals nominations are 
frequent and quite predictable (because the great majority of appellate judges take 
senior status immediately when eligible to do so), a fact that has not prevented contro-
versy with respect to some nominations.  See MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES:  
THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 128 (1994) (“The pattern of 
modern American politics virtually assures contentious proceedings in the selection of 
federal judges.”); id. at 164 (“The process of selecting and confirming judges has be-
come thoroughly democratized, and that increases the likelihood of contentious pro-
ceedings, whatever the background and quality of the nominee.”). 
96 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 39-41; see also Carrington & Cramton, su-
pra note 2, at 468 (“Supreme Court appointments have become politically contentious 
not only because the justices exercise great power but because they exercise it for so 
long.”); DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 13, at 1139-44. 
97 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 40.  In arguing that the “explanation 
for this strife lies in . . . the enormous power of life tenure, the potential to extend that 
power through strategic departures, and presidential incentives to nominate young 
justices,” DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 13, at 1141, other proponents of change fail 
to explain why some appellate court nominations have become so controversial. 
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the increasingly common practice of Presidents to pursue what Shel-
don Goldman calls a policy agenda in making nominations to all fed-
eral appellate courts and the Senate’s reaction to those nominated 
pursuant to such an agenda.98  Potentially affecting both a President’s 
agenda and the Senate’s reaction are what Benjamin Page calls “the 
context of the times,”99 and the interest group environment in which 
appointments are made.  In any event, lumping Supreme Court and 
lower court nominations is hazardous from the Senate’s perspective,100 
and those who are inclined to see the treatment of Judge Bork as the 
98 See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 17, at 54 -68 (discussing presidential goals); id. 
at 110-15 (discussing the role of ideology in the confirmation process); SHELDON 
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES:  LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT 
THROUGH REAGAN 3-4 (1997) (distinguishing partisan, personal and policy agendas); 
NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS:  POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL 
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 6 (2005) (discussing Nixon’s “policy-based strategies”); 
id. at 27 (“Simply stated, in the selection and confirmation of lower federal court 
judges, it is the politicians’ pursuit of these policy-oriented strategies . . . that has led to 
the heightened politicization of the lower federal court appointment process.”); 
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 95, 166-71 (discussing the Ginsburg appointment); YALOF, su-
pra note 17, at 185 (“[Attorney General Meese’s] insistence [in 1987] on the pursuit of 
policy goals at all costs ultimately dealt a serious blow to the administration’s partisan 
interests.”); Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush’s Judiciary:  The First Term Record, 88 JUDI-
CATURE 244, 245 (2005) (positing the “central role judicial appointments play in the 
President’s domestic policy agenda”). 
99 Nor should we forget the context of the times.  Bork, an articulate, ener-
getic, and ideological conservative, was nominated to the Court at a time when 
it appeared that the entire ideological balance and substantive direction of the 
Court could easily be tipped.  To many, his approval to the Court would have 
meant the probable overturning of Roe v. Wade, reversal of some civil rights 
decisions, and the establishment of a conservative Court for years to come.   
Page, supra note 77, at 1028; see also EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 17, at 109 (noting as 
one reason Scalia “breezed through the Senate” the fact that “senators perceived his 
appointment as being of little consequence to the composition of the Court”); 
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 95, at 5 (arguing that “the measure of characteristics such as 
‘qualifications’ or even ‘ideology’ is never static but fluctuates over time in response to 
the political realities of the day”).  One of those political realities by the time of the 
Bork nomination was the growth of interest groups.  See YALOF, supra note 17, at 160 
(“The Bork nomination became a watershed in terms of interest group involvement in 
the appointment process.”); id. at 189 (“Encouraged by their success, these and other 
special interests naturally would vie for influence over future Supreme Court appoint-
ments as well.”); infra text accompanying note 106. 
100 Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power:  The Senate’s Role in the Ap-
pointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24 (2002) (discussing the different roles 
played by the Senate in considering nominations to the various federal courts). 
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root of all evil should recall President Reagan’s judicial appointment 
agenda.101
Just as proponents of change tend to concentrate on formal pow-
ers and processes to the exclusion of informal processes and strategic 
interaction, so do they leave largely out of account (or make unsup-
ported assertions about)102 the role of interest groups in shaping the 
environment in which Supreme Court nominations and confirmations 
take place.  Moreover, they give insufficient attention to the potential 
effect of interest groups and the environment they can create on pub-
lic support for the Court.  I seek to fill that gap, first, by reviewing 
what empirical research tells us about the incentives and tactics of in-
terest groups in federal judicial appointments, and second, by consid-
ering the possible effects of frequent and predictable appointment 
controversies framed by interest groups in light of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on legitimacy.  That literature suggests to me that, 
far from being a remedy for an existing or impending problem of le-
gitimacy, the frequent and predictable vacancies occurring under 
plans for nonrenewable, long-term appointments might create a crisis 
of legitimacy, cementing the worst tendencies of modern politics. 
The work of Jack Walker and his colleagues suggests that interest 
groups are here to stay, and it also suggests that neither the incentives 
101 See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 95, 121-23 (discussing “[t]he campaign to change 
the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court” during the Reagan administration); 
YALOF, supra note 16, at 133-67 (discussing Reagan’s “pursuit of conservative ideo-
logues”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power:  
Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 366-67, 396-99 (2003) 
(same); supra note 99. 
As convenient as it may be to trace present-day ideological conflict in the judi-
cial appointments process to particular high-profile episodes, however, Senate 
rejection of Supreme Court nominees was hardly a new phenomenon in 1987.  
Indeed, statistical analysis suggests that Bork’s rejection fits historical trends in 
the confirmation of Supreme Court justices.  Rather, it is conflict over the ap-
pointment of circuit and perhaps even district judges that appears to have es-
calated.  Moreover, this escalation was under way before the defeat of the Bork 
nomination.  
David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges:  The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 490 (2005) (footnotes omitted); see also David S. Law 
& Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option 36 
(Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 07-10, 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=791244 (“From this perspective, 
the high-profile defeat of Robert Bork’s nomination . . . was another wholly unsurpris-
ing symptom of appointments gridlock.”). 
102 See supra note 95. 
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shaping their behavior nor their tactics bode well for the claim that 
frequent and predictable appointments at two-year intervals would 
generate less controversy and reduce the politicization of the Court.  
Walker’s work divides interest groups into a number of types:  profit, 
nonprofit, mixed, and citizen.103  Citizen groups enjoyed the greatest 
growth in the period he studied.104  Walker found that “most citizen 
groups that emerged from social movements in the past have simply 
faded away once the intense enthusiasms of their followers began to 
cool, or when a string of policy defeats or compromises caused mar-
ginal supporters to lose hope.”105  He also found, however, that in the 
1980s, 
many of the citizen groups born during the 1960s and 1970s were still in 
business, with help from their individual and institutional patrons, even 
though public interest in their causes had declined.  These groups now 
promote concern for their issues and stand ready to exercise leadership 
whenever there is a new burst of public enthusiasm.
106
  
103 David C. King & Jack L. Walker, Jr., An Ecology of Interest Groups in America, in 
JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA:  PATRONS, PROFES-
SIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 57, 57 (1991) [hereinafter MOBILIZING INTEREST 
GROUPS]. 
104 King & Walker, supra note 103, at 63; Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Mobilization of Po-
litical Interests in America, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 103, at 19, 34-35; 
see also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 95, at 64 (“With the coming of the Burger Court, in the 
early 1970s, an assortment of these interests—for example, environmentalists, femi-
nists, consumer groups, political reformers—found in the judiciary an attractive alter-
native to the other branches in the battle to secure their goals.”); id. at 71 (“Powerful 
groups from all points along the ideological spectrum now consider a sympathetic ju-
diciary essential to the development and achievement of important policy goals.”). 
105 Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Three Modes of Political Mobilization, in MOBILIZING IN-
TEREST GROUPS, supra note 103, at 185, 194. 
106 Id. at 195.  An important contribution of Walker’s work was his response to 
public choice theory, which posits that, because of the collective action problem, inter-
est groups can come into existence and survive only if they offer personal benefits to 
members that are sufficiently attractive to overcome that problem, or if their members 
are coerced into joining (e.g., unions).  Walker’s work made it clear that patronage 
from foundations, individuals, and the government itself has been instrumental in the 
birth and continued existence of many interest groups.  See David C. King & Jack L. 
Walker, Jr., The Origins and Maintenance of Groups, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, 
supra note 103, at 75, 85-102; Jack L. Walker, Jr., Explaining the Mobilization of Interests, in 
MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 103, at 41, 41-55.  He also emphasized the 
extent to which groups of some sorts seek not personal benefits for their members but 
collective goods (which is, of course, a threat to the premises of public choice).  That 
led him to suggest that, “[i]nstead of attempting to include nonmaterial incentives in a 
model seeking to explain collective action, one should ask under what conditions indi-
viduals will join groups in order to advance purposive—which is to say collective—
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Walker tested the extent to which various types of interest groups 
follow “inside” strategies (e.g., lobbying in Congress) or “outside” 
strategies (e.g., appeals to the public), and the reasons why they do so.  
His findings indicated that, in contrast to most occupational associa-
tions (e.g., the ABA), which concentrated on lobbying, most citizen 
groups followed “outside” strategies to appeal to the public through 
the mass media and telephone (and after his work was published, elec-
tronic mail and mobile text messages).107
Perhaps most important for present purposes, Walker found that 
citizen groups 
seeking to further a cause thrive on controversy and must gain the atten-
tion of the mass media in order to convince their patrons of the organi-
zation’s potency, and also to communicate effectively with their far-flung 
constituents.  The structure and operation of these citizen groups is de-
termined by the requirements of an “outside” strategy of influence.
108
  
goals.”  Walker, supra, at 47.  His answer with respect to citizen groups “supplying pur-
posive benefits” was that they 
are very likely to rely heavily upon outside patrons rather than their members 
for financial support.  Presumably, the patrons make investments in groups 
precisely because they are effective advocates for a cause or because they do a 
good job of representing the interests of a constituency that the patron wishes 
to see protected or promoted.  
King & Walker, supra note 106, at 93; see also id. at 101. 
107 See Jack L. Walker, Jr., Introduction to MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 
103, at 1, 9; Thomas L. Gais & Jack L. Walker, Jr., Pathways to Influence in American Poli-
tics, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 103, at 103, 113-14; Thomas L. Gais et 
al., Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions, in MOBILIZING INTEREST 
GROUPS, supra note 103, at 123, 132.  Moreover, “[o]nce either an inside or outside 
strategy becomes the association’s dominant approach, it is very difficult to move in a 
new direction.”  Gais & Walker, supra, at 119. 
108 Walker, supra note 107, at 12; see also DAVIS, supra note 50, at 95 (“Organiza-
tionally, groups benefit from controversial nominations.”). 
There is a theatrical quality to such fights in Washington that makes short-
term national celebrities out of certain activists, such as [Ralph] Neas, who 
normally spend their time slogging in the C-SPAN trenches.  Like a cicada, 
Neas surfaces once every few years to sing his liberal fight songs for a national 
audience.  And the irony of his life is that the bigger the threat to his ideologi-
cal worldview, the more enjoyable his job becomes.  
Michael Crowley, Secret Passion, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2005, at 14.  Celebrating the 
growth of interest groups as a means to break down “iron triangles,” Walker found that 
“citizen groups tried to expand the scope of conflict through the use of the media and 
other forms of publicity rather than allow policy to be established within the network 
of subgovernments.”  Gais et al., supra note 107, at 132. 
By mobilizing supporters and making efforts to move conflicts into broader 
political arenas whenever possible, the citizen groups diminished the auton-
omy of subgovernments, made policy outcomes less predictable, and forced 
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 If a group is operating in a policy area marked by conflict, one in 
which many organized groups are advancing different political interests 
and policy alternatives, both members and patrons will increase their 
demands for political or purposive benefits in return for group support, 
and the conflictual environment will produce incentives for interest 
groups to increase their involvement in all kinds of political action. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Groups with a far-flung membership united only by their dedica-
tion to a cause . . . are naturally drawn toward controversial issues and 
tactics that will capture the attention of their diffuse membership and 




More recent work by Caldeira, Hojnacki, and Wright in the spe-
cific context of federal nominations confirms a number of Walker’s 
findings, while suggesting modifications in others.  This research con-
firms that the groups studied tended not to vary the mixture and pro-
portional use of tactics, although the intensity of use may have dif-
fered, in relation to the salience of particular nominations.110  At the 
same time, however, the authors did not find any dichotomy between 
“inside” and “outside” tactics:  “Groups generally engage in a wide 
the policy debate into forums open to public view . . . . Because most of these or-
ganizations now have the capacity to remain on the scene, there will no longer naturally 
be periods of political repose when the traditional interests can reestablish secure subgov-
ernments.”  
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).  For the view that “the iron triangle concept . . . has never 
been capable of describing policymaking outside the distributive context,” see Daniel 
McCool, The Subsystem Family of Concepts:  A Critique and a Proposal, 51 POL. RES. Q. 551, 
556 (1998).  Proposing a shift from an institutional to a functional perspective, accord-
ing to which “[p]olicy moves up and down the hierarchy of conflict, and subsystems 
respond accordingly,” id. at 565, McCool derives a number of testable hypotheses that 
could be useful in assessing the conflictual environment of Supreme Court nomina-
tions, see id. at 565-66. 
109 Gais & Walker, supra note 107, at 105. 
Citizen groups make policymaking all the more difficult because they fre-
quently sharpen the ideological debate; they have different organizational in-
centive systems from those of the corporations and trade groups with which 
they are often in conflict; and they place little emphasis on the need for eco-
nomic growth, an assumption shared by most other actors.  
Jeffrey M. Berry, Citizen Groups and the Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics in Amer-
ica, 528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jul. 1993, at 30, 36.  On the use by interest 
groups of public confirmation hearings “to gain greater attention for their agendas,” 
see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 67 (2000). 
110 See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Fed-
eral Judicial Nominations, 62 J. POL. 51, 52, 62 (2000). 
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range of activities on all types of federal judicial nominations.”111  They 
concluded that “organizations are not participating in nomination 
campaigns simply to maintain their organizations—that is, to give 
members or patrons the impression that their dues or contributions 
are being well spent,” but rather that “they are seriously attempting to 
provide any and all information that might affect the outcome.”112  It 
is therefore no surprise that these authors believe that interest groups 
are also here to stay in the politics of federal judicial nominations.113
As previously noted, if there is a dynamic relationship between 
specific and diffuse support, it appears that, although diffuse support 
can insulate the Court from serious damage resulting from an un-
popular decision, an accumulation of such decisions may erode dif-
fuse support.  Some of the more theoretically sophisticated work in 
this area attributes the insulating capacity of diffuse support to a 
“framing effect” whereby unpopular decisions are cushioned (the 
“bias of positivity frames”) by general views about the Court and the 
rule of law.114  Other research suggests that framing of a different sort 
can adversely affect diffuse support, namely the framing of questions 
in terms of specific results (e.g., Bush v. Gore ended the election con-
111 Id. at 59.  The latter finding led the authors to question “the conventional wis-
dom about the importance of resources in organizational choice of tactics.”  Id. at 67; 
see also SCHERER, supra note 98, at 108-32 (discussing strategies and tactics of interest 
groups involved in the confirmation process). 
112 Caldeira et al., supra note 110, at 67.  Put otherwise, lobbying—meaning all of 
the tactics used by interest groups—“is not merely about taking positions or engaging 
in limited action to maintain the organization or gain publicity; instead, lobbying is 
about winning politically and doing whatever is necessary to do so.”  Id. at 52. 
113 Caldeira and his colleagues noted: 
 Some scholars view the organized activity on federal judicial and related 
nominations in the 1980s and early 1990s as unique, episodic, limited, and 
sporadic; the groups active on nominations as limited in range, capability, and 
resources; and the Bork and Thomas nominations as exceptional, somehow 
different from typical nominations or legislative issues.  Our research here 
suggests the opposite.  Organized interests, at least during the 1980s and early 
1990s, mobilized often, on a variety of nominations, mustered an impressive 
array of capabilities and resources, and employed a wide variety of activities on 
each. . . . The technology may differ somewhat, and, of course, more organ-
ized interests exist now, but the essentials of lobbying campaigns appear to be 
much the same today as in the past.  
Id. at 67-68; see also DAVIS, supra note 50, at 157 (“Clearly, these external players will not 
go away.”). 
114 See Gibson et al., supra note 84, at 553-56 (suggesting positivity frames as a theo-
retical explanation of findings). 
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troversy) rather than general or abstract notions (i.e., partisanship) as 
to which framing does influence specific support.115
Putting these two strands of legitimacy research together suggests 
reason for concern about frequent and predictable Supreme Court 
appointments in the interest group environment that Walker and sub-
sequent researchers describe.  For, the study of federal nominations 
discussed above, which included five recent Supreme Court nomina-
tions (Bork through Kennedy), shows that, in each, citizen groups 
participated far more than did other types of interest groups and 
more generally that “citizen groups, professional associations, and in-
stitutional advocates [e.g., the Alliance for Justice] dominate the poli-
tics of federal judicial nominations.”116  It is, of course, an empirical 
question what information and messages such groups try to convey, 
and it seems likely that some of that information and those messages 
will vary depending on both the nominee and the audience.  In com-
municating with the public, directly and through the media (with 
which they typically have “a great deal of credibility”),117 such groups 
may couch their concerns (pro or con) in terms of general issues such 
as ideology.  Just as frequently, one imagines, they are likely to be con-
cerned, or to project concern, about results (i.e., this appointment will 
determine the future of Roe v. Wade).118
Regular exposure of the public to messages, whether received di-
rectly or through the mass media, that frame the Court’s work in 
terms of results simpliciter could alter the frame through which the 
public reacts to specific decisions, at the same time affecting diffuse 
support.  That is, diffuse support among the general public might 
come to behave as if it were specific support, as research has found 
that it does among elites (the attentive public).119  This seems particu-
larly likely if the results in question relate to issues salient to the public 
at large, such as race, religion, and the like.  Moreover, recalling that 
115 See Nicholson & Howard, supra note 82, at 690. 
116 Caldeira et al., supra note 110, at 56.  For a statistical report of these groups’ 
participation in recent federal appointments, see id. at 58 tbl.2. 
117 Berry, supra note 109, at 38. 
118 See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 103; cf. Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Ju-
dicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391, 1402 (2001) (“One political action committee 
. . . ran full-page newspaper ads on the Sunday prior to the election that proclaimed, 
‘Will partial birth abortion and same-sex marriage become legal in Idaho?  Perhaps so 
if liberal Supreme Court Justice Cathy Silak remains on the Idaho Supreme Court.’”). 
119 See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 80, at 656 (finding that for many opinion 
leaders “diffuse support behaves as if it were specific support”). 
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the same research found greater diffuse support for the Court among 
those who are less dogmatic,120 perhaps the ideologically committed 
should be regarded as a “community” in the same way, and with the 
same implications for awareness of the Court’s decisions and support 
for the institution, as the geographical communities that have been 
subject to public opinion research.121
We know that the mass media play an important role in setting the 
national agenda,122 and we should question whether the Court is dif-
ferent from the presidency in the effect that greater media exposure 
has on the amount or variety of public criticism.  Indeed, scholars 
have suggested that “the stability of the Court’s evaluations over time 
may be a function of insufficient knowledge rather than an enduring 
level of trust,” leading the authors to “wonder if greater awareness of 
the Court would result in more volatile evaluations and more prob-
lems of enforcement and compliance for an institution whose major 
currency is legitimacy.”123  Such a suggestion may seem inconsistent 
with research finding a correlation between greater awareness of the 
Court and its work and greater levels of diffuse support.124  Those find-
ings concern the attentive public, who are most likely to espouse “the 
belief that judicial decisions are based on autonomous legal princi-
ples.”125  I have suggested that some distinctions between the attentive 
and nonattentive public might disappear (or that the definition of the 
“attentive public” might change) with greater attention to the Court 
that was promoted and framed by interest groups.  In that regard, the 
explanation other scholars have offered for the correlation between 
awareness and diffuse support involves exposure to “legitimizing mes-
sages.”126  If, on the other hand, greater awareness of the Court were 
120 “Dogmatism also exerts a direct effect on support:  the less dogmatic among 
our sample tend to lend the Court greater support.”  Id. at 653. 
121 See Hoekstra, supra note 63, at 98 (noting that “there are many types of com-
munities other than geographical”). 
122 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court:  FDR’s 
Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1139-40 (1987) (noting the role the 
mass media played in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s failure to garner public sup-
port for his court-packing plan).  For a valuable account of the media’s evolving role in 
Supreme Court appointments, see DAVIS, supra note 50, at 96-102, 142-53. 
123 Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 61, at 373. 
124 See Gibson et al., supra note 84, at 547-50. 
125 Scheb & Lyons, supra note 76, at 929-31. 
126 James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 343, 345 (1998); cf. Scheb & Lyons, supra note 68, at 190 (“[T]here is reason to 
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brought about by delegitimizing messages (i.e., those framed in terms 
of results), would there not be less diffuse support?  Indeed, whatever 
the dynamic between diffuse and specific support, if the frame were 
altered, might there not be less of both?127
An assessment of the baneful effects that the incentives of, and 
tactics pursued by, interest groups could have on an appointment 
process that was put in play not just frequently but predictably should 
not assume, however, that such groups would be successful in creating 
the sort of conflictual environment in which they thrive.  Again, the 
appointments of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are informative.  More-
over, it is possible that the existence of predictable appointments 
would permit politics to play a more constructive role through logroll-
ing, as, according to Kim Scheppele, it does in other countries with 
high courts whose judges serve fixed terms.128  The question requires 
one to consider the tendencies of modern politics and to predict in 
which direction they are likely to lead.  Here again, Jack Walker’s work 
is helpful. 
fear that popular demystification of judicial decision making may further erode popu-
lar esteem for the Court.”). 
127 Rather than better and worse craft, justices will be assessed only by those 
who are for or against some position.  If the decisions become understood 
only as wins and losses, we feed the politicization and gaming of judicial ap-
pointments that have become ever more systematic in an effort to predict, 
and control, the decisions of appointees.  
Susan S. Silbey, The Dream of a Social Science:  Supreme Court Forecasting, Legal Culture, and 
the Public Sphere, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 785, 789 (2004).  
 For the “heresy” that “diffuse support is a cause and not a consequence of specific 
support” through framing and selective perception, see Gibson et al., supra note 126, at 
356-57; see also Page, supra note 77, at 1024, 1024 n.1 (suggesting that specific and dif-
fuse support “influence each other in a complex reciprocal fashion”). 
128 Posting of Kim Lane Scheppele to Balkinization, Liberals Should Want Rehnquist 
to Retire Too, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005_06_26_balkin_archive.html#11202712770916625 
(July 1, 2005 22:22 EST).  My colleague Ted Ruger suggests another possible set of in-
centives that might moderate presidential behavior: 
If each 4-year term gets to fill 2 vacancies, every first-term President who con-
templates reelection will know for certain that (1) in the run for reelection 
the public will know that the winner gets 2 more appointments; and that (2) 
his 2 first term appointments will be exhibits 1A and 1B in public debate over 
what kind of judges he will choose.  My guess is that this might produce a kind 
of moderating effect that is not now present in our regime of high uncertainty 
about the timing of retirements . . . .  
E-mail from Theodore W. Ruger, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsyl-
vania, to Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, 
University of Pennsylvania (July 29, 2005) (on file with author).   
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Walker, who welcomed the broader participation in government 
afforded by interest groups, was alert to their impact on parties.  He 
reasoned that, “[w]hen interest groups begin to attract resources and 
attention to their causes, the parties are forced to alter their programs 
and reformulate their supporting coalitions to accommodate to shifts 
in the public’s principal concerns”129 and that “[t]he leaders of both 
political parties and interest groups are discovering that ideological 
commitment, under some circumstances, can serve as a sound basis 
for long-term organizational membership.”130  Moreover, he noted re-
search finding “that most of the associations with formal and enduring 
access to the White House are citizen groups—the type that has en-
joyed the greatest growth in the 1960s and 1970s.”131  Finally for pre-
sent purposes, Walker concluded that “[a]s the circle of participants 
in the dialogue over public policy grows and the political system be-
comes increasingly polarized along ideological lines, each individual 
interest group will be under pressure to encourage the fortunes of the 
political party that affords it the best access to government.”132
Empirical evidence cannot tell us, of course, whether, in making 
nominations to the Court under the proposed system of nonrenew-
able eighteen-year terms, the Presidents of the future would be able to 
resist the demands of “ideological commitment” and react to interest 
group pressures as did President Clinton and, perhaps, President 
George W. Bush in his nomination of Chief Justice Roberts, or 
whether they would react as have some other recent Republican Presi-
dents.133  Of course, the same is true of the reaction to nominations by 
the opposition party in Congress.134  Even if log-rolling is plausible 
129 Walker, supra note 107, at 14; see also Walker, supra note 104, at 39. 
130 Walker, supra note 104, at 35. 
131 Gais et al., supra note 107, at 139. 
132 Mark A. Peterson & Jack L. Walker, Jr., Interest Groups and the Reagan Presidency, 
in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 103, at 141, 156; see also SCHERER, supra 
note 98, at 192 (“[Politicians] want to be reelected above all else.  This means that poli-
ticians must cater to political activists who are responsible for mobilizing voters on the 
politicians’ behalf.  To ignore the activists’ demands is to risk losing the next elec-
tion.”). 
133 See SCHERER, supra note 98, at 6 (finding that “the exploitation of ideological 
litmus tests remains predominantly a Republican elite mobilization strategy”); infra 
note 141 and accompanying text. 
134 See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 95, at 158 (“The current reality is that the confirma-
tion process now demands a calculation of political variables so complex that even the 
most experienced and electorally secure senators are often unable to predict the 
course and outcome of the proceedings.”). 
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when there are two concurrent vacancies, it may be wishful thinking to 
imagine it for successive vacancies “in a two-party system with diverse 
coalitions of the left and right organized into single parties.”135  It is 
hard to believe, in any event, that frequent and predictable appoint-
ments would not become a fixture of partisan, if not of ideological, 
politics.136
Notwithstanding research results tending to negate the influence 
of partisanship on diffuse support,137 one has to wonder whether the 
same would hold true if the Court became a frequent and predictable 
issue in, and if its work were framed to suit the needs of, partisan elec-
tion campaigns.  If so, a system resulting in two vacancies in each 
presidential term could cement a process—treating courts as part, not 
just of a political system, but of ordinary politics-–that should concern 
not just law professors and political scientists, but the general public.  
For in such a system, law itself could be seen as nothing more than or-
dinary politics, and it could become increasingly difficult to appoint 
people with the qualities necessary for judicial independence—in part 
because the actors involved would be preoccupied with a degraded 
135 Scheppele, supra note 128.  “There are reasons to think that today’s levels of 
ideological conflict and gridlock have more to do with presidential efforts to push 
ideologically unpalatable nominees past unwilling senators, than with any inability of 
repeat play to sustain cooperation among fellow senators.”  Law, supra note 101, at 506; 
see id. at 510 (“For senators, logrolling goes unremarked as collegiality or business as 
usual.  Such behavior does not, however, characterize the presidency.” (footnote omit-
ted)); SCHERER, supra note 98, at 152-53 (“Because the key party and issue activists to-
day place ideological purity over political compromise . . . presidents are much more 
loath to enter into judicial log-rolls.”). 
136 Kritzer recently explained: 
The gap between Republicans and the other two groups [Democrats and In-
dependents] has sharply narrowed in the last couple of years.  However, that 
reflects a sharp drop in the support among Republicans, from a high of 64 
percent of Republicans reporting “quite a lot” or a “great deal” of confidence 
in the Supreme Court immediately after Bush v. Gore (the highest level of sup-
port among Republicans in the series) to the most recent figure in the high 
40s.  One can only speculate on the reason for the drop in confidence among 
Republicans.  Is it due to decisions dealing with issues such as gay rights and 
affirmative action, or the Court’s unwillingness to intervene in the Terry [sic] 
Schiavo case?  Is it due to attacks on the courts generally by Republican and 
conservative leaders?  Unfortunately, it is not possible to pinpoint the reason 
for this sharp decline.  
Kritzer, supra note 85, at 171. 
137 See, e.g., Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 80, at 643 (finding “no evidence to but-
tress the argument for a connection between partisanship and institutional support for 
the Court”); cf. Lehne & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 899 (finding no significant rela-
tionship between partisanship and approval of court performance). 
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notion of judicial accountability.  At the end of the day, judicial inde-
pendence could become a junior partner to judicial accountability, or 
the partnership could be dissolved.  As recently put by the Washington 
Post: 
 The war [over Justice O’Connor’s successor] is about money and 
fundraising as much as it is about jurisprudence and the judicial func-
tion.  It elevates partisanship and political rhetoric over any serious dis-
cussion of law.  In the long run, the war over the courts—which teaches 
both judges and the public at large to view the courts simply as political 
institutions—threatens judicial independence and the integrity of Ameri-
can justice.
138
Ward Farnsworth’s defense of life tenure pays close attention to 
strategic interaction between the President and Congress.  Indeed, a 
major theme of his article is that the presidential incentives which are 
a foundation of some proposals for change—such as trying to capture 
the Court for generations by appointing young Justices—are subject to 
the braking force of the Senate.139  Of course, in political circum-
stances like those obtaining today, that may be thought to depend on 
the survival of the filibuster as a tool of pivotal nomination politics.140  
Even with the filibuster at risk, the recent nomination of Chief Justice 
Roberts may reflect precisely the sort of strategic dynamic that Farns-
worth emphasizes.141  If the filibuster did not survive for judicial nomi-
138 Editorial, Not a Campaign, WASH. POST, July 3, 2005, at B6; see also Editorial, su-
pra note 48, at 4 (discussing “the partnership between accountability and independ-
ence” and the importance of distinguishing “means that would foster that partnership 
from those which might destroy it”). 
139 See Farnsworth, Regulation of Turnover, supra note 6, at 429-30 (discussing presi-
dential decision making “in the shadow of the confirmation process”). 
140 See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS:  A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 23-24 
(1998) (explaining the pivotal politics model, including the filibuster pivot); Law, su-
pra note 101, at 513; Law & Solum, supra note 101, at 25-45 (applying Krehbiel’s model 
to judicial appointment process and including the nuclear pivot). 
141 A recent piece in the New Republic argued: 
Republicans warn Democrats that their obstructionism will cost them at the 
polls.  Perhaps.  But it also appears to have forced Bush into choosing a more 
conciliatory nominee.  Bush seems to have calculated that, with the Iraq war, 
his failed domestic agenda, and even the Karl Rove scandal, he cannot afford 
a contentious confirmation battle.  He seems to have been geniunely spooked 
by the Democrats’ threat of a filibuster.  
Ryan Lizza, Legal Theory, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2005, at 15, 16; see also Law & Solum, 
supra note 101, at 46 (“A president’s political mortality—particularly that of a lame-
duck president entering the second half of his last term—can be expected to influence 
his choice of nomination strategy.”). 
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nations, the concern about presidential incentives would be more se-
rious,142 but again, the primary source of concern is not long tenures 
but rather the President’s appointment agenda;143 the appointment 
process is not the only means by which the Court is held accountable, 
and, in light of the evidence from political science that I have re-
viewed, frequent and predictable vacancies under a system of nonre-
newable eighteen-year terms seem more likely to feed the disease of 
power politics than to cure it.144
CONCLUSION 
In recent years there has been substantial progress in bridging the 
gaps, which once approached chasms, between the legal and political 
science literatures on courts.  Today many scholars in both disciplines 
are seriously grappling with the traditional wisdom about judges and 
the judicial process they inherited, and they are thus trying to figure 
out the roles that law, individual preferences, and strategic behavior 
142 Yet, “notwithstanding the existence of a nuclear pivot, the threat of a filibuster 
nevertheless enables minority senators to extract some degree of substantive conces-
sions from the president, in the form of less extreme judicial nominees.”  Law & 
Solum, supra note 101, at 44. 
143 In a very interesting paper my colleague Ted Ruger explores “judicial prefer-
ence change,” using Justice Blackmun as an exemplar but adducing recent studies sug-
gesting that the phenomenon of Justices “drifting” from the preferences they held at 
the time of appointment is common.  He adumbrates some of the implications of this 
phenomenon, particularly with respect to the assumption of stable preferences under-
lying theories of “partisan entrenchment.”  See Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Black-
mun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209 (2005); see also 
EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 17, at 137-39 (discussing preference drift among other 
causes of declining presidential influence).  This perspective thus also calls in question 
assumptions underlying concern about “locking-up” the Court through the appoint-
ment of young Justices, and it illuminates the attempt by presidents to appoint strong 
ideologues to the bench. 
A judge’s political beliefs, his or her policy preferences, should not cause con-
cern unless they hold sway with such power as to be impervious to adjudicative 
facts, competing policies, or the governing law as it is generally understood.  
When an individual’s belief system about social needs or aspirations is that 
powerful, it seems fair to speak of ideology.  And on this understanding, ide-
ology is revealed as the enemy of judicial independence.  
Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom:  Independence, Imagination and Ideology 
in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1999 (1997) (citations omitted). 
144 See Gruhl, supra note 16, at 72 (“[P]olitical parties and interest groups would 
still fight over an [eighteen]-year appointment . . . . Perhaps they would even fight 
harder . . . because they would be able to gear up in advance for the scheduled retire-
ments.”) 
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play in judicial decisions, as they are the relationship between judicial 
independence and judicial accountability.  These scholars understand 
that the traditional wisdom in both disciplines is simplistic, that there 
is a place for both normative and empirical scholarship in seeking a 
more nuanced account that captures what is actually going on in 
courts, and similarly that there are limits to what both can accomplish, 
particularly if they proceed in isolation. 
In a recent article that considers the politics of the federal courts 
and the federal judiciary, I lament the tendency toward “posterity wor-
ship” and institutional self-aggrandizement of the current Court.145  I 
am aware, however, that these are not unprecedented phenomena for 
that body,146 as I am that the “current Court” will not remain such for 
very much longer.  Mark Silverstein reminds us that 
 [e]ven Frankfurter succumbed to the reformer’s frustration with hy-
peractive judicial review.  So great was his disaffection with the Supreme 
Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down innovative 
state legislation that in 192[4] he announced in the pages of the New Re-




As I share the momentary frustration evident in the writings of 
some proponents of changing Supreme Court tenure, I invite them to 
share the perspective that a consideration of history and of the lessons 
of political science can provide.  Whether or not scholars should be 
interested in affecting the course of public policy, when they make 
proposals that are designed to do that, there is a duty, in my view, to 
145 Burbank, supra note 81, at 60; see also Nagel, supra note 24, at 132-33.  The pos-
sibility that the Court’s post-1994 decisions invalidating federal statutes reflected stra-
tegic behavior that considered ideological distance from the sitting (rather than the 
enacting) Congress, see Friedman & Harvey, supra note 37, at 138-39, does not speak, 
or at least speak clearly, to this normative question.  Moreover, those decisions estab-
lish precedents that can be used as a shield for subsequent decisions at a time when the 
ideological distance is greater.  Cf. Fallon, supra note 78, at 1822 n.153 (“[T]he force of 
the doctrine of stare decisis lies in its capacity to perpetuate what once was judicial er-
ror or to forestall inquiry into the possibility of legal error.”). 
146 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY:  POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LA-
BOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994). 
147 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 95, at 40 (citation omitted) (alteration of date derived 
from Editorial, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1924,  
reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 158, 158 n.                                                                  
(Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970); see also id. at 49 (“The crisis of the old order had been set 
in motion by a judicial arrogance founded on a mistaken belief that the resolute exer-
cise of judicial review could withstand the political impulses of the times.”). 
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escape disciplinary shackles, to discipline theory with evidence, to view 
contemporary phenomena in historical context, and to resist the 
natural human inclination to confuse personal preferences with social 
good. 
